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We examine which social comparisons most affect happiness with pay that is unequally 
distributed (e.g., salaries and bonuses). We find that ensemble representation–attention to 
statistical properties of distributions such as their range and mean––makes the proximal 
extreme (i.e., the maximum or minimum) and distribution mean salient social comparison 
standards. Happiness with a salary or bonus is more affected by how it compares to the 
distribution mean and proximal extreme than by exemplar-based properties of the payment, 
like its comparison to the nearest payment or its distribution rank. This holds for randomly 
assigned and performance-based payments. Process studies demonstrate that ensemble 
representations lead people to spontaneously select these statistical properties of pay 
distributions as comparison standards. Exogenously increasing the salience of less extreme 
exemplars moderates the influence of the maximum on happiness with pay, but exogenously 
increasing the salience of the distribution maximum does not. As with other social 
comparison standards, top-down information moderates their selection. Happiness with a 
bonus payment is influenced by the largest payment made to others who solve the same math 
problems, for instance, but not by the largest payment made to others who solve different 
verbal problems. Our findings yield theoretical and practical insights about which members of 
groups are selected as social comparison standards, effects of relative income on happiness, 
and the attentional processes involved in ensemble representation.        
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Imagine you begin a new job at an organization where all salaries are transparent, such as 
in government or at a public university. How your salary compares to the salaries of your 
colleagues will influence your satisfaction with your own salary (Clark & Oswald, 1996; Hsee, 
Yang, Li, & Shen, 2009; Morewedge, Zhu, & Buechel, 2019; Mussweiler, 2003; Perez-Truglia, 
2019), but among all those alternatives, which will have the greatest influence? We propose that 
the ensemble representation of groups (e.g., Ariely, 2001; Brady & Alvarez, 2011) makes useful 
predictions for determining the most influential comparison standards under these circumstances. 
Ensemble representation of groups makes extreme members of a set the most salient members. 
Depending on whether your pay is above or below average, it suggests that the highest or lowest 
paid member of a group, respectively, will be the most salient standard to which you compare 
your own pay.  
Ensemble representation refers to the phenomenon that recall for a set of similar objects 
is often reduced to a few statistical properties of the group, such its set mean and range (e.g., 
Ariely, 2001; Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Chong & Treisman, 2003; Marchant, Simons, & Fockert, 
2013). After seeing lines of varying length, people forget most exemplars in the set, but 
remember the average line length, and the length of the largest and smallest lines. This pattern of 
representation extends to social categories (de Fockert & Wolfenstein, 2009), such as the 
emotional expressiveness of a set of faces (e.g., Haberman & Whitney, 2007). We suggest that 
ensemble representation influences which social comparisons are most salient when people 
compare themselves to other members of a group (Davidai & Deri, 2019), and thus ensemble 
representation impacts happiness with their relative position (Kluegel & Smith, 1986).  
Our theory is distinctive in predicting that social comparisons within groups are not 
automatically made to the most proximal relevant member—the person whose status is most 
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similar to their own (Festinger, 1954; J. Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002). People instead should 
compare themselves to the mean and most salient values in the group, typically the value of the 
endpoint on their side of the range (i.e., the distribution maximum or minimum; Ariely, 2001). A 
person making an above average salary would then compare her salary to the group mean and 
highest salary, for instance, whereas a person making a below average salary would compare his 
salary to the group mean and lowest salary. A second point of distinction is that our ensemble 
representation account implies that people should be insensitive to other properties of groups, 
particularly information that would require representing the group at an exemplar level (i.e., 
attending to all individual members), such as their relative rank in the group (e.g., Stewart, 
Chater, & Brown, 2006), or information that relies on the perceived inequity of the distribution 
(e.g., Gini coefficient; Starmans, Sheskin, & Bloom, 2017).  
Our theory is useful for predicting and understanding how comparative judgments are 
modulated by the composition and values of sets. In particularly, we identify influential 
statistical properties of relevant and salient social groups (e.g., colleagues and neighbors; Clark 
& Oswald, 1996; Cullen & Perez-Truglia, 2018; Luttmer, 2005; Morse & Gergen, 1970; Tesser 
& Collins, 1988). We test our theory in the context of pay, given the importance of social 
comparisons involving money and the precision with which money can be quantified (Putnam-
Farr & Morewedge, 2019). We specifically measure happiness with pay as a measure of its 
contextual utility (Kahneman & Krueger, 2006; Krueger & Schkade, 2008), and manipulate its 
set of potential comparison standards within a given domain (i.e., the distribution of other 
payments for similar work). Our experiments elucidate which statistical information is influential 
when people compare themselves to social groups, why it is influential, and contribute 
experimental evidence to a literature that often relies on survey data to study similar relationships 
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between income, social comparison, and well-being (Diener & Seligman, 2004; Dolan, 
Peasgood, & White, 2008).  
We manipulated pay in a variety of different group settings, including salaries, 
performance-based bonuses, and randomly assigned bonuses, to test the robustness and 
generalizability of the effects and process. In all experiments, we modulated the distribution 
maximum or minimum or both (i.e., the highest or lowest payment, respectively), and measured 
satisfaction with the pay that participants received. As additional robustness checks, we tested 
the relative effect of the distribution maximum or minimum across different means (Experiment 
5) and payments received (Experiment 4). We also orthogonally manipulated distribution 
maximums and relative rank in Experiment 3, and controlled for the inequity of the distribution 
in Experiment 1. For process tests, we exogenously manipulated the salience of the distribution 
maximum and other values to test whether the maximum was already endogenously salient but 
other values were not (Experiment 6), and manipulated the relevance of values to be included in 
the distribution (Experiment 7). Exogenously increasing the salience of the distribution 
maximum had no effect, but exogenously increasing the salience of other (lower) values 
modulated the influence of the distribution maximum on satisfaction with pay received, as did 
manipulating its perceived relevance. Together, our theory and findings yield new insight into 
the ways people compare themselves to groups, effects of relative income on happiness, and the 
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All participants (N = 4,191) were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk through 
TurkPrime, and were residents of the United States with a 95% or higher approval rating. No 
participant was allowed to participate in more than one experiment. In all experiments in which 
participants received a real bonus payment (Experiments 2-7), participants received an advertised 
base wage plus an unadvertised additional bonus payment. Sample size was set in advance to the 
largest number that was financially practical for each experiment, with a minimum of 60 
participants per cell, and a mode of 100 participants per cell. 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Payments Received. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants were asked about the salary 
associated with a hypothetical job offer. In Experiments 2-7, participants reported their reactions 
to the receipt of a real bonus payment. In Experiment 2, participants first completed a short task 
and then received a bonus payment. In Experiment 7, participants were only eligible for the 
bonus upon successful completion of a task. In Experiments 3, 4, 5, and 6, participants were 
given a randomly assigned bonus payment with no additional task.  
In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants were shown ten salaries paid for the same job in 
their company, displayed in random order, one at a time, each presented for 3 seconds. In 
Experiments 2-6, participants were shown the ten other bonus payments ostensibly paid to the 
last ten participants, displayed in random order, one at a time, each presented for 3 seconds. In 
Experiment 7, participants saw all other bonuses simultaneously, and then received their own 
bonus payment. Aside from Experiment 4, where bonuses were manipulated by condition, all 
participants within each experiment were paid the same bonus.  
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Payment Distributions. Fictional bonus payments to other participants were varied to 
create specific distributions. In all experiments, the distribution maximum was varied between 
conditions, but the means and distribution minimums were held constant, with two exceptions. In 
Experiment 1b, the distribution minimum was varied between conditions. In Experiment 5, the 
distribution means were manipulated across conditions. All distributions addressed rank as an 
alternative driver of satisfaction; they were designed so that relative rank would have predicted 
equal or greater satisfaction with the bonus payment received in conditions where the maximum 
was larger. In Experiment 3, relative rank was explicitly manipulated. Maximums, minimums, 
means, and bonus payments for each experiment are included in Table 1. All distributions 
(including means, ranks, and Gini coefficients) are included in Table 2.  
Dependent Variables. Immediately after receiving their bonus payment, participants 
reported their happiness with the bonus they received1 on a 7-point scale with endpoints, Not at 
all Happy (1) and Extremely Happy (7). In Experiments 2, 5, and 6, participants were also asked 
how well they were paid relative to other participants on a 7-point scale with endpoints, Not at 
all Well (1) and Very Well (7). Finally, in a response box (open-ended) or slider format, 
participants recalled the distribution maximum, minimum, and mean of the ten bonuses paid to 
other participants, as a manipulation check.  
Reporting 
Participant Exclusions. No participants who completed the experiments were excluded 
from any analyses. Regression results for all dependent variables are reported in the Appendix. 
                                                          
1 In Experiment 5, we also asked participants how disappointed they were with their bonus. This measure was 
strongly (negatively) correlated with happiness with the bonus (ρ = -.63) so it was not used in any other experiments 
due to its minimal incremental value. It is reported in the Appendix.  
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We focus our discussion in the results sections on how happy participants were with the bonus 
that they received.  
Recall Accuracy. Overall, participants exhibited accurate recall, with an average 
absolute difference between recalled and actual amounts across all experiments of 6-11¢ for the 
mean bonus (SD = .09-.13), and maximum bonus (SD = .11-.14), and 3-9¢ for the minimum (SD 
= .09-.18). All recall data is reported in Table 3, as a manipulation check. Note that distribution 
maximums did appear to influence recollection of the mean. Participants recalled the distribution 
mean to have been directionally (Experiments 5 and 6) or significantly higher (Experiments 2, 3, 
4 and 7) in conditions in which the distribution maximum was higher. We do not exclude 
participants whose estimates diverged significantly from the actual maximum, minimum, or 
mean bonus; excluding these cases would increase the significance of most results.  
 
Experiments 1A & 1B: Maximum and Minimum Salaries  
In Experiments 1A and 1B, we manipulated the distribution maximum in both 
experiments and the distribution minimum in Experiment 1B to examine their impact on above 
and below average salaries (Experiments 1A and 1B, respectively). Our ensemble theory predicts 
that happiness with a salary should be influenced by its comparison to the most proximal 
distribution extreme––the distribution maximum in Experiment 1A and the distribution 
minimum in Experiment 1B. In Experiment 1A, we structured the distributions so that they also 
tested alternative account suggested by Festinger (1954), that the most proximal salary in terms 
of absolute distance should be the most influential comparison standard. 
 Method 
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For Experiment 1A, we set sample size in advance to 200 participants, which we 
requested from Amazon Mechanical Turk; 205 participants completed the experiment for a base 
payment of 25¢ (43% women; Mage = 35.9, SD = 11.9). For Experiment 1B, we requested 400 
participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk; 401 completed the experiment for a base payment 
of 25¢ (45% women; Mage = 35.7, SD = 10.6). 
Procedure  
In both experiments, participants considered a hypothetical salary offer for a new job. 
Through connections, they learned the salaries of ten other people in the same position at that 
company. These ten salaries were displayed on the pages that followed. Each of the ten salaries 
was displayed on a separate page for three seconds, in a random order.  
In Experiment 1A, all participants were randomly assigned, between-subjects, to one of 
two distribution conditions in which the distribution maximum was $50,000 or $60,000. In both 
distributions, the average salary was $40,000 and the minimum salary was $28,000. Both 
distributions were similarly unequal as measured by their Gini coefficients (see Table 2), and the 
salary offered to participants had the same rank in both distributions. The distributions in 
Experiment 1A were also structured to discern which payment was more salient—the most 
proximal distribution extreme (the maximum) or the most proximal salary in terms of absolute 
distance. Our theory suggests that the distribution maximum should be a more salient 
comparison standard, so participants should be more satisfied when the maximum was $50,000 
than when it was $60,000. By contrast, an absolute proximity account (Festinger, 1954) would 
suggest that participants should be more satisfied in the condition where the distribution 
                                                                                    DOI: 10.1037/xge0000965 
© 2020, American Psychological Association. 
 
10 
maximum was $60,000, because in that distribution the most proximal salary was only $1,000 
more than the amount paid to participants, whereas the most proximal salary was $4,000 more 
than the amount paid to participants in the distribution with a maximum of $50,000.  
In Experiment 1B, all participants were randomly assigned, between-subjects, to one of 
four distribution conditions in which the maximum salary was $50,000 or $60,000, and the 
minimum salary was $25,000 or $30,000. In all four distributions, the average salary was 
$40,000.  
In both experiments, after seeing the ten other salaries at that position, participants saw 
their salary offer. In Experiment 1A, it was $45,000, which was above the mean. In Experiment 
1B, it was $32,000, which was below the mean. Participants then reported their happiness with 
that salary on a 7-point scale with endpoints, Not at all Happy (1) and Extremely Happy (7).  
 
Results and Discussion 
We examined happiness with the high salary (above the mean) in Experiment 1A with a 
one factor between-subjects ANOVA, which revealed a significant effect of the distribution 
maximum ($50,000 vs. $60,000), F(1, 203) = 7.14, p = .008, η2 = .03. Supporting our ensemble 
theory of comparison, rather than an absolute proximity account (Festinger, 1954) or a ranking 
account (Stewart et al., 2006), participants were happier with their own salary when the 
distribution maximum was $50,000 (M = 5.86, SD = 1.00) than when the distribution maximum 
was $60,000 (M = 5.45, SD = 1.23, t (203) = 2.67, p = .008, d = .37). Holding constant the 
properties of mean, minimum, rank, and gini coefficient of a distribution of salaries paid to 
                                                                                    DOI: 10.1037/xge0000965 
© 2020, American Psychological Association. 
 
11 
coworkers, then, the salary paid to the highest earner was influential in determining participants’ 
satisfaction with the wage they received. 
 
 Figure 1. Reported happiness with above and below average salaries by distribution maximum in 
Experiments 1A and 1B (left and center panel, respectively), and with a below average salary by 
distribution minimum in Experiment 1B (right panel). (Bars represent 95% CI.)  
 
For Experiment 1B, we analyzed the happiness measure for the low salary in a 2 
(maximum salary: $60,000, $50,000) x 2 (minimum salary: $25,000, $30,000) between-subjects 
ANOVA, which yielded a significant main effect of the minimum salary, F(1,397) = 7.17, p = 
.008, ηp2 = .02, but no significant effect of the maximum salary, F(1,397) = 2.75, p = .098. 
Participants were happier receiving a below average salary when the distribution minimum was 
$25,000 (M = 3.29, SD = 1.68) than when the distribution minimum was $30,000 (M = 2.84, SD 
= 1.61, t (399) = 2.77, p = .006, d = .28). Happiness with receiving a below average salary did 
not significantly differ whether the distribution maximum was $50,000 (M = 3.23, SD = 1.70) or 
$60,000 (M = 2.94, SD = 1.61, t (399) = 1.78, p = .08, d = .18), although the trend was generally 
consistent with the direction found in Experiment 1A. There was no significant maximum salary 
x minimum salary interaction, F(1, 397) = .02, p > .25. 
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Together, the results provide initial support that ensemble representation influences 
which social comparisons are endogenously salient in a distribution. Satisfaction with a salary 
was influenced by the most proximal extreme value in the salary distribution from which it was 
drawn––the maximum in Experiment 1A and the minimum in Experiment 1B. Comparisons to 
proximal extremes were more influential than comparisons to the most proximal values in 
Experiment 1A, and were influential in both experiments despite holding constant the inequality 
of salary distributions and the relative rank of the salary that participants received. In the 
experiments that follow, we tested whether ensemble representation influences the selection of 
social comparison standards in the context of real pay.   
 
Experiment 2: Performance-Based vs. Random Payments 
Reactions to unequal pay are certainly influenced by the reasons for pay inequality (for a 
review, see Williams, McDaniel, & Nguyen, 2006). In Experiment 2, we examined whether 
sensitivity to proximal distribution extremes is due to ensemble representations, or to inferences 
they might evoke about the reasons for inequitable pay. In an incentive-compatible design, we 
manipulated whether compensation was (ostensibly) performance-based or randomly 
determined. As ensemble representation is driven by attention to statistical properties of the set, 
not the reasons for which the set is constructed, we predict that in this context, satisfaction with 
pay would be driven by distribution maximums, not by the reason that pay was unequally 
distributed (e.g., Starmans et al., 2017).  
 
Method 
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We set sample size in advance to 240 participants, which we requested from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk; 240 participants completed the experiment for a base payment of $1 (41% 
women; Mage = 34.1, SD = 9.9). One participant who completed survey items but did not work on 
the focal Boggle task (i.e., found no words) was excluded from the results. 
Procedure 
In a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to one of two bonus 
distributions with a distribution maximum of 40¢ or 60¢, and to one of two bonus assignment 
methods: participants were either told that bonuses were performance-based or randomly 
determined.  
Before receiving information about bonuses, all participants worked on a Boggle-like 
task in which they were given up to 5 minutes to try to find as many words as possible. 
Participants were required to spend at least 2 minutes on the task before moving to the next page. 
After completing the task, participants in the random bonus condition were told “Congratulations 
– you have earned a randomly assigned bonus for participating today.” Participants in the 
performance based bonus condition were told, “Congratulations – based on your performance 
today, you have earned a bonus.”  
All participants were then told that they would see the bonuses paid to the last ten 
participants. The bonuses shown were actually from one of the two predetermined distributions, 
with a distribution maximum of 40¢ or 60¢. Each bonus shown for three seconds, and bonuses 
were displayed in a random order. The distribution mean in both distributions was 20¢ and the 
distribution minimum was 1¢.  
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Participants in the performance condition were told that their “performance-weighted” 
bonus was 32¢, whereas participants in the random condition were told that their “randomly 
assigned” bonus was 32¢. All participants were then asked “How happy are you with your 
bonus?” and “How well do you feel you were paid compared to others in this task?” They then 
estimated the average bonus and recalled the distribution maximum and minimum using sliding 
scales with endpoints of 0 and $1.00.  
 
Results and Discussion 
We analyzed reported happiness in a 2 (maximum bonus: 40¢, 60¢) x 2 (bonus 
assignment: performance-based, random) between-subjects ANOVA, which yielded a significant 
main effect of the maximum bonus, F(1,235) = 4.08, p = .04, ηp2 = .02 no significant effect of 
performance condition F(1,235) = .81, p > .25, and no significant maximum bonus x bonus 
assignment interaction, F(1, 235) = .67, p > .25. Participants were happier when the maximum 
bonus was 40¢ (M = 5.76, SD = 1.12) than when it was 60¢ (M = 5.49, SD = 1.10, t (237) = 1.92, 
p = .055, d = .25). Happiness did not differ whether the bonus assignment was performance-
based (M = 5.57, SD = 1.20) or randomly assigned (M = 5.68, SD = 1.00, t (237) = .76, p > .25).  
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Figure 2. Happiness with bonus pay by the reason for bonus assignments and the distribution maximum 
in Experiment 2 (bars represent 95% CI). 
 
Assessments of relative value of the bonus payment (i.e., how well participants thought 
they were paid relative to others) exhibited a similar pattern. The analysis yielded a significant 
main effect of the maximum bonus, F(1, 235) = 7.28, p = .01, ηp2 = .03; participants in the low 
maximum condition reporting being better paid (M = 5.48, SD = 1.01) than did participants in the 
high maximum condition (M = 5.11, SD = 1.05). There was no main effect of bonus assignment, 
F(1, 235) = .42, p > .25, and no significant interaction, F(1, 235) = 1.19, p > .25. 
Whether the bonus was linked to performance or randomly assigned, satisfaction with an 
above average bonus was influenced to a greater degree by the maximum bonus in a distribution 
than by the reason for bonus assignments. In other words, participants appeared to be averse to 
inequality in payments regardless of the process by which those payments were determined. 
Even in the performance-based distribution, where differences in bonuses were ostensibly related 
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comparison to the distribution maximum. We speculate that no differences were observed 
between random and performance-based distributions in this context, because the reasons for 
unequal pay in the latter distribution were inevaluable. There was no salient comparison standard 
by which to evaluate their performance (Morewedge, Kassam, Hsee, & Caruso, 2009). 
Participants might assume that others performed better or worse, but had no information on 
which to determine whether the performance-based distribution was fair or unfairly determined. 
In the experiments that follow, we eliminate the performance component, and focus on the 
properties of the payments and distributions themselves to further test our ensemble 
representation account. 
 
Experiment 3: Distribution Maximums vs. Relative Ranks 
Method 
Experiment 3 extended our inquiry by orthogonally manipulating the distribution 
maximum of the bonuses paid to others, and the relative rank of the bonus that participants 
received. Our ensemble representation theory predicts that distribution maximums should 
influence satisfaction with the bonus received, but that participants should be insensitive to the 
relative rank of the bonus that they received. By contrast, a rank-based account would predict 
that relative rank in the distribution should be the primary determinant of satisfaction with the 
bonus received (e.g., Stewart et al. 2006).     
Participants 
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We set sample size in advance to 600 participants, which we requested from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk via TurkPrime; 598 participants (49% women; Mage = 35.9, SD = 11.2) 
completed the experiment for a base payment of 25¢.  
Procedure  
All participants in Experiment 3 received a real bonus, and were told that it was randomly 
assigned. Before seeing their own bonus, participants were shown ten bonuses (ostensibly) paid 
to a sample of ten other participants. In a between-subjects design, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four bonus distributions, which varied both the distribution maximum (a 
maximum bonus of either 40¢ or 60¢), and the relative rank in the distribution of the bonus that 
participants received (4th place or 7th place). In all four distributions, the distribution mean was 
26¢ and the distribution minimum was 1¢. After seeing their bonus payment of 29¢, participants 
reported how happy they were with their payment and then estimated the maximum, minimum, 
and average bonus payments. 
 
Results and Discussion 
We analyzed reported happiness with bonuses in a 2 (distribution maximum: 40¢, 60¢) x 
2 (distribution rank: 4th, 7th) between-subjects ANOVA, which yielded a significant main effect 
of the distribution maximum, F(1,594) = 9.02, p = .003, ηp2 = .01, but no significant effect of 
distribution rank, F(1,594) = 0.89, p > .25, or a distribution maximum x distribution rank 
interaction, F(1, 594) = .61, p > .25. As predicted by our ensemble representation theory, 
participants were sensitive to the distribution maximum, but not to the order of individual 
exemplars. Participants were happier when the distribution maximum was 40¢ (M = 5.52, SD = 
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1.07) than when it was 60¢ (M = 5.25, SD = 1.17, t (596) = 2.98, p = .003, d = .24), but were not 
sensitive to whether the bonus that they received was ranked 4th (M = 5.42, SD = 1.14) or ranked 
7th (M = 5.34, SD = 1.12, t (596) = .91, p > .25). 
 
Figure 3. Happiness with bonus paid by rank and distribution maximum in Experiment 3 (bars represent 
95% CI).  
 
 
Experiment 4: Varying Bonuses Paid 
In Experiment 4, we further examined the robustness of the influence of ensemble 
representations on comparative judgments by testing its influence on three different bonuses in 
one experiment, all above the mean. We also compared the relative effect of these different 
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We set sample size in advance to 1,200 participants, which we requested from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk; 1,219 participants (49% women; Mage = 36.4, SD = 12.1) completed the 
experiment for a base payment of 40¢.  
Procedure 
All participants in Experiment 4 received a real bonus, and were told that it was randomly 
assigned. Before seeing their own bonus, participants were shown ten bonuses (ostensibly) paid 
to the last ten participants. In a between-subjects design, participants were assigned to a bonus 
distribution with a maximum of either 40¢ or 60¢, and were paid one of three different bonus 
amounts (i.e., 27¢, 33¢, or 39¢). In both distributions, the mean bonus was 26¢ and the minimum 
bonus was 1¢. After seeing their bonus payment, participants reported how happy they were with 
their payment and then completed the same recall questions, as in Experiments 2 and 3.  
 
Results 
 We examined happiness reports in a 2 (maximum bonus: 40¢, 60¢) x 3 (bonus paid: 27¢, 
33¢, 39¢) ANOVA, which revealed significant main effects of maximum bonus and bonus paid, 
F(1, 1213) = 42.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .03 and F(2, 1213) = 44.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .07, respectively. 
There was no significant interaction, F(2, 1213) = 1.43, p = .24. Participants were happier with 
their bonus when the maximum bonus was 40¢ (M = 5.75, SD = 1.16) than when it was 60¢ (M 
= 5.32, SD = 1.27, t (1217) = 6.14, p < .001, d = .35). Participants were also happier when paid 
higher bonuses; they were least happy when paid 27¢ (M = 5.14, SD = 1.35), happier when paid 
33¢ (M = 5.59, SD = 1.14), and happiest when paid 39¢ (M = 5.91, SD = 1.07; Figure 1). Indeed, 
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a linear contrast effect also shows a significant negative effect of the higher maximum bonus at 
each level of bonus paid (F(3,1213) = 15.10, p < .001, all contrasts ≤ -.28, all 95% CI’s ≤ -.51). 
(Basic linear regression effects are reported in the Appendix.) 
 
 
Figure 4. Happiness by bonus pay and the distribution maximum in Experiment 4. 
 
Further decomposition of the effects on happiness suggests that in Experiment 4, relative 
comparison to the distribution maximum was no less influential than the absolute size of the 
bonus payment. A Wald test for equality of coefficients showed no difference between the linear 
effect of the bonus amount (using a continuous measure for the bonus since amounts are 
equidistant, B = .39, SE = .04) and the effect of the maximum bonus (B = .44, SE = .07), F (1, 
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relative comparison between pay and the distribution maximum can be as influential as the 
absolute amount of pay received. 
 
Experiments 5: Varying the Mean 
Experiment 5 extended testing of our ensemble representation account by examining 
sensitivity to two statistical properties of distributions, the maximum and the mean. We again 
paid participants real bonuses and varied distribution maximums in the opposite directions of 
relative rank, but this time also varied the distribution mean across conditions. We expected both 
the distribution mean and maximum to modulate satisfaction with a real bonus earned in the 




We set sample size in advance to 400 participants, which we requested from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk; 3772 participants (39% women; Mage = 34.1, SD = 11.8) completed the 
experiment for a base payment of 50¢.  
Procedure 
As in Experiments 2 and 4, all participants were told they would receive a randomly 
assigned bonus payment and were then shown the bonuses paid to the last ten other participants 
                                                          
2 400 were recruited, but an incorrectly formatted question meant that the first 26 participants did not see some of 
the questions. This was corrected, but the total recruited was not adjusted.  
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before being told their own bonus amount. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
different bonus distributions in a between subjects design, with a distribution mean of either 20¢ 
or 30¢, and a distribution maximum of either 40¢ or 60¢. The distribution minimum was always 
1¢. All participants received a wage bonus of 32¢ (above the mean) and were asked how happy 
they were with their own bonus payment, how well they felt it compared to others, and then 
answered the same recall questions asked in previous experiments.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Analysis of happiness ratings in a 2 (distribution mean: 20¢, 30¢) x 2 (distribution 
maximum: 40¢, 60¢) between-subjects ANOVA revealed significant main effects of mean and 
maximum bonus, F(1, 373) = 8.47, p = .004, ηp2 = .02 and F(1, 373) = 6.48, p = .011, ηp2 = .02, 
respectively. There was no significant interaction, F(1, 373) = 0.90, p > .25. Participants were 
happier with their bonus when the mean was 20¢ (M = 5.77, SD = 1.05) than when the mean was 
30¢ (M = 5.44, SD = 1.19, t (375) = 2.88, p < .01, d = .30). Despite the distribution maximum 
being inversely related to bonus rank, participants were also happier with their bonus when the 
maximum bonus paid was 40¢ (M = 5.75, SD = 1.09) than when it was 60¢ (M = 5.46, SD = 
1.16, t (375) = 2.51, p = .01, d = .26).  
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Figure 5. Happiness with bonus pay by distribution mean and distribution maximum in Experiment 5 
(bars represent 95% CI).  
  
 
The influence of distribution maximums and means, despite their inverse relationship 
with bonus ranking, provides further evidence that reward distributions are represented as 
ensembles. Their influence is similar on the reports of comparative satisfaction with rewards. A 2 
(distribution mean: 20¢, 30¢) x 2 (distribution maximum: 40¢, 60¢) between-subjects ANOVA, 
revealed significant main effects of distribution mean and maximum on comparative satisfaction, 
F(1, 373) = 39.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, and F(1, 373) = 4.67, p = .03, ηp2 = .01, respectively, and 
no significant interaction, F(1, 373), = .68, p = .41. Participants felt they were paid better when 
the mean was 20¢ (M = 5.26, SD = 0.95) than when the mean was 30¢ (M = 4.65, SD = 0.94), 
and participants felt they were paid better when the maximum was 40¢ (M = 5.05, SD = 1.01) 
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Experiment 6: Process Test 
Experiment 6 tested the attentional underpinnings of our process. In a control condition, 
participants received a bonus payment and saw a pay distribution as before. In two salience 
conditions, we manipulated low-level features of one payment in the distribution to make it 
salient: the distribution maximum or another lower value. Our theory suggests that the 
distribution maximum should already be endogenously salient in the control condition and used 
as a comparison standard. Thus, exogenously making it salient should not increase its impact on 
happiness with the bonus received. By contrast, exogenously making a lower value salient 
should reduce increase the likelihood that it would be used as a comparison standard, and its 




We set sample size in advance to 600 participants, which we requested from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk; 600 participants (45% women; Mage = 33.8, SD = 10.6) completed the 
experiment for a base payment of 50¢.  
Procedure 
As in the previous experiments, participants first saw bonuses paid to the last ten 
participants and then saw and responded to the bonus they received. They were randomly 
assigned to one of six different conditions in a 2 (distribution maximum: 35¢, 45¢) x 3 (salience: 
control, distribution maximum, 21¢ bonus) between-subjects design. Participants in the control 
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condition first saw the ten other bonus amounts, in a random order (as in previous experiments). 
Participants in the distribution maximum salient condition saw nine bonus amounts in a random 
order, followed by the distribution maximum, which was presented last in a larger, bolded font. 
Participants in the 21¢ salient condition saw nine bonus amounts in a random order, followed by 
21¢, which was presented last in a larger, bolded font (both distributions included 21¢).  
The mean bonus for all distributions was 25¢ and the minimum was 5¢. All participants 




We examined happiness reports in a 2 (distribution maximum: 35¢, 45¢) x 3 (salience: 
control, distribution maximum, 21¢) between-subjects ANOVA, which revealed a significant 
main effect of the distribution maximum, F(1,594) = 12.62, p <.001, ηp2 = .02. There was no 
main effect of salience condition, F(2, 594), = .68, p > .25. Most important, it revealed the 
predicted distribution maximum x salience interaction, F (2, 594) = 5.18, p = .006, ηp2 = .02.  
We used simple effect tests to decompose the interaction, which revealed that it was 
driven by the condition in which 21¢ was made salient. Whereas the effect of the distribution 
maximum was significant in both the maximum salient and control conditions, it was not in the 
21¢ salient condition. In that condition, participants were similarly happy with their bonus, 
whether the maximum was 35¢ (M = 6.01, SD = 1.05) or 45¢ (M = 6.08, SD = .95; t(197) = .50, 
p > .25,). By contrast, when the distribution maximum was made salient, participants were 
happier when the distribution maximum was 35¢ (M = 6.16, SD = .87) than when it was 45¢ (M 
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= 5.77, SD = 1.02, t(197) = 2.91, p = .004, d = .41), as in the control condition, where 
participants were happier when the maximum was 35¢ (M = 6.34, SD = .75) than when it was 
45¢ (M = 5.81, SD = 1.19, t(200) = 3.82, p < .001, d = .54, see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 6. Happiness with bonus paid by salient bonus and distribution maximum in Experiment 6 (bars 
represent 95% CI). 
Together, the results provide process evidence that ensemble representation influences 
the selection of comparison standards from a distribution. Making distribution maximums salient 
did not change their impact on happiness with the bonus payment relative to control conditions. 
Presumably, distribution maximums were already endogenously salient and used as comparison 
standards. By contrast, making a smaller payment salient mitigated the importance of the 
distribution maximums, providing further evidence that ensemble representation determine the 
standards selected for comparative judgments. Further evidence of the endogenous salience of 
the statistical properties of the distribution is provided by a lack of an effect of the salience 
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the maximum, average, and minimum bonus should already be endogenously salient in all 
conditions (see Table 3), recall of these values was similarly accurate across all three conditions.  
 
Experiment 7: Distribution Relevance 
Experiment 7 tested whether top-down factors that bound social comparisons are 
similarly influential in determining which stimuli are included in the ensemble representation of 
the distribution to which rewards are compared. We provided participants with the distribution of 
bonuses paid for the task they performed, or bonuses paid for both the math task they performed 
and an additional verbal task that they did not perform. As social comparisons are typically 
bounded by the relevance of the comparison standards and the target (e.g., Georgellis, Garcia, 
Gregoriou, & Ozbilgin, 2019; Morse & Gergen, 1970; Tesser & Collins, 1988), we expected that 
participants would be sensitive to the distribution of bonuses paid for the math task they 
performed, but would not pay attention to the distribution of bonuses paid for the unrelated 




Unlike previous experiments, participants in Experiment 7 were only eligible for the 
bonus if they had demonstrated sufficient effort and attention to the task by answering at least 
four out of five question correctly. We recruited 560 participants from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, with the goal of having a sample size of at least 100 per cell (300 total); 551 participated 
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for a base payment of 50¢, of which 330 (42% women; Mage = 37.4, SD = 11.2) correctly 
completed the questions to be eligible for a bonus.  
Procedure 
All participants were recruited for an unnamed task and were told that they would be 
assigned to one of two different types of tasks: either a math task or a word-search (i.e., verbal) 
task. They were then told that all participants who answered at least four questions correctly 
would receive a randomly assigned bonus. All participants were assigned to the math task, where 
they were shown five multiple-choice questions (Mcorrect = 3.66, SD = 1.32). After completing the 
questions, they were shown how many they had answered correctly.  
Participants who had answered at least four problems correctly were then randomly 
assigned to see one of three different bonus schemes. In two math-only conditions, participants 
saw a sample of ten bonuses paid to other participants who completed the math task (displayed 
simultaneously on one screen), with either a 61¢ or 41¢ distribution maximum. The third 
condition displayed the ten bonuses for the math task for the 41¢ distribution maximum 
distribution, alongside ten bonuses ostensibly paid to participants who completed the verbal task, 
with a maximum of 60¢ (also all on one screen). All participants were then told that their own 
bonus was 29¢ and asked the same satisfaction question as in previous experiments. Participants 
who saw only the math bonuses were asked recall questions about the math bonuses, while 
participants who saw both bonus groups were asked to recall information about both math and 
verbal distributions.  
 
Results 
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Happiness with bonus a one-factor three-level between-subjects ANOVA (math only, 
41¢ math distribution maximum; math only, 61¢ math distribution maximum; math and verbal, 
41¢ math distribution maximum), which yielded a significant main effect, F(2, 327) = 11.12, p = 
.01, ηp2 = .03. Simple effects tests revealed that participants were happier in the math only 
conditions when the distribution maximum was 41¢ (M = 5.00, SD = 1.59) than when the 
distribution maximum was 61¢, (M = 4.52, SD = 1.67, t (219) = 2.19, p = .03). By contrast, 
participants who saw the 41¢ math distribution with the 60¢ verbal distribution (M = 5.11, SD = 
1.50, t (218) = .57, p > .25) were no different from those who saw only the 41¢ math distribution. 
Overall, this suggests that each distribution was processed as its own ensemble representation, 
with information from the other (irrelevant) distribution not included in the comparison.  
Further support for the selective incorporation of relevant information comes from an 
examination of the recall information. Participants were generally accurate in recalling the high 
for the math distribution, estimating an average of $0.45 if they had seen a maximum of 41¢, and 
$0.57 if they had seen a maximum of 61¢. However, when asked about the verbal distribution, 
participants were much less accurate, with an average estimate of $0.47 for the maximum (SD = 
.18), despite the actual maximum being $.60 (one-sided t (108) = 7.45, p < .001). Indeed, the 
absolute difference between the verbal distribution maximum and their estimates (M = .16, SD = 
.14) was significantly larger than the absolute difference between the math distribution 
maximum and their estimates (M = .09, SD = .09, t (108) = 5.17, p < .001). An exploratory 
analysis among those few who recalled the verbal maximum more accurately (28 participants 
who estimated $0.55 to $0.65 as the maximum out of 109 who saw the verbal distribution) 
revealed that they were significantly less satisfied with the bonus that they were paid (M = 4.43, 
SD = 1.64) than participants who saw the verbal distribution and did not estimate correctly (M = 
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5.36, SD = 1.38, t(107) = 2.92, p = .004). Together, this suggests that payments in the verbal task 
were not endogenously salient for most participants, but for the subsample of participants who 
did attend to payments in the verbal task, its distribution extreme also influenced happiness with 
their payment.   
 
Figure 7. Happiness with bonus pay by distribution maximums in Experiment 7 (bars represent 95% CI). 
Together, the results suggest that top-down factors can determine which stimuli are 
included in the ensemble to which pay is compared. Most participants selectively compared their 
pay to the payment distribution for the relevant math task, and better recalled the statistical 
properties of the payment distribution for the math task than of the payment distribution for the 
verbal task. These findings show that stimulus relevance moderates which distributions influence 
comparative judgments in social contexts, and provide important additional evidence of selective 
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Ensemble representations predict which social comparison standards are selected in 
groups, and, in turn, how people evaluate their position in unequal pay distributions. The results 
provide insights for literatures on social comparisons and positional goods. They illustrate which 
properties and members of a group are influential comparison standards, and explain why. 
Ensemble representation leads means and distribution extremes to be influential properties of 
relevant and salient social groups, particularly the most proximal extreme in a distribution of 
rewards. While the well-off may be less concerned about falling to the distribution minimum 
than the less fortunate (Kuziemko, Buell, Reich, & Norton, 2014), the distribution maximum is 
salient and influential in determining satisfaction with their pay.  
Ensemble representation may help to explain why maximums are such salient and 
memorable comparison standards – the wealthiest, the luckiest, the most successful, the most 
traveled (Davidai & Deri, 2019; Morewedge & Todorov, 2012; Perez-Truglia, 2019), and can be 
so deleterious for satisfaction and performance (Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Morewedge, 
Zhu, & Buechel, 2019; Rogers & Feller, 2016), even when position in a distribution is inferred 
from minimal signals (Kraus, Park, & Tan, 2017). While motivation may direct attention to 
downward comparisons to enhance satisfaction with rewards (Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wills, 
1981), or toward upward comparison standards to motivate progress (Huguet, Galvaing, Monteil, 
& Dumas, 1999; Seta, 1982), extreme exemplars appear to be salient due to the statistical 
properties of the group that they represent. Beyond the influence of extremes on comparative 
evaluations of rewards received, exploratory analyses reveal that distribution extremes also bias 
perceptions of the affluence of a group. Across all of our experiments, estimates of the mean 
were consistently, and in some cases significantly, higher when the distribution maximum was 
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higher (see Table 3), consistent with a constructive representation of the ensemble (Brady & 
Alvarez, 2011).  
The results of Experiments 6 and 7 suggest bottom-up and top-down ways to moderate 
the influence of these statistical properties of groups on comparative judgment. Increasing the 
salience of an alternative comparison standard within the relevant distribution, by increasing its 
size, contrast, and recency, reduced the impact of the distribution maximum on satisfaction in 
Experiment 6. Manipulating the perceived relevance of comparison standards moderated their 
influence on satisfaction with a reward in Experiment 7. Participants were insensitive to the 
distribution of bonuses paid to other participants for completion of a different verbal task than 
the math task that they performed, which was otherwise similar in font and size and formatting 
(Experiment 7). Together, these results points toward the involvement of selective attention at 
multiple levels in the construction of ensemble representations, and its influence on comparative 
judgment to groups.  
Social comparison research tends to examine the influence of a single or given 
comparison standard on self and social judgment (Putnam-Farr & Morewedge, 2019; Smith & 
Zarate, 1992; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992; Wills, 1981). Our findings contribute to this literature 
by identifying comparison standards that are likely to be spontaneously selected from a group, 
and that ensemble representation is what makes these distribution extremes and means potent 
comparison standards. While we could not simultaneously control for every statistical feature of 
distributions or completely control for inequality, across the entire set of experiments we 
demonstrate a consistent attention to salient extremes as an important feature of comparative 
distributions. The groups we created were anonymous and arbitrary, but ensemble 
representations, and thus extremes and means, may be even more potent when groups are 
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cohesive and entitative or considered more abstractly and distantly (Maglio, Trope, & Liberman, 
2013; Morewedge, Chandler, Smith, Schwarz, & Schooler, 2013), as people often think of their 
countrymen, colleagues, and neighbors.  
 
  
                                                                                    DOI: 10.1037/xge0000965 
© 2020, American Psychological Association. 
 
34 
Context of the Research 
 This work originated from discussions about which information about groups is noticed 
and processed in the context of social comparison. The authors noted, anecdotally, that people 
tend to use extreme members of a group (e.g., a CEO or the lowest paid workers) as comparison 
standards rather than more proximal group members, much as people tend to recall extreme 
events from categories of past experiences, whether making affective forecasts (Morewedge, 
Gilbert, & Wilson, 2005), temporal comparisons (Morewedge, 2013), or behavioral predictions 
(Morewedge & Todorov, 2012). We then examined the role of ensemble representation on social 
comparison with monetary payments due to the precision with which they can be quantified. We 
expect similar effects of ensemble representations on social comparisons involving other 
attributes of groups that can be easily reduced to statistical properties including warmth, 
competence, performance, status, wealth, health, and beauty. Future work might examine the 
effects of these comparisons on downstream behavior, such as whether comparison to a 
distribution maximum is demotivating or if its effect modulated by proximity to that extreme. 
Other contributions could include further exploring the processes involved in selecting which 
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Table 1.  
Ns, Distribution Minimums, Means, Maximums and Amounts Paid to Participants by Experiment 
 
Experiment   N  Minimum Mean  Maximum      Amount(s) Paid 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1A   205  $28k  $40k  $50k/$60k  $45k 
1B   401  $25k/$30k $40k  $50/$60k  $32k 
2   239  1¢  20¢  40¢/60¢  32¢ 
3   598  1¢  26¢  40¢/60¢  29¢ 
4   1,219  1¢  26¢  40¢/60¢  27¢/32¢/36¢ 
5   377  1¢  20¢/30¢ 40¢/60¢  32¢ 
6   600  5¢  25¢  35¢/45¢  32¢ 
7   551/330 1¢  26¢  41¢/61¢  29¢ 
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Table 2.  
Payment Distributions, Payment Ranks, and Gini Coefficients by Experiment 
 
  
amount paid rank Gini coeff
Experiment 1a high max 28, 31, 35, 37, 38, 38, 42, 45, 46, 60 45 3rd* 0.12
(in thousands) low max 28, 33, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45, 49, 50 45 3rd* 0.10
Experiment 1b high max, low min 25, 31, 35, 37, 38, 40, 42, 45, 46, 60 32 9th 0.12
(in thousands) high max, high min 30, 31, 35, 37, 38, 39, 42, 45, 46, 60 32 9th 0.11
low max, low min 25, 30, 36, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 49, 50 32 9th 0.11
low max, high min 30, 31, 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45, 49, 50 32 9th 0.09
Experiment 2 high max .01, .03, .09, .12, .13, .15, .21, .28, .42, .60 0.32 3rd 0.46
low max .01, .04, .12, .15, .16, .21, .25, .33, .37, .40 0.32 4th 0.25
Experiment 3 high max, low rank .01, .04, .08, .11, .30, .31, .32, .37, .49, .60 0.29 7th 0.40
high max, high rank .01, .04, .12, .14, .21, .22, .28, .41, .53, .60 0.29 4th 0.42
low max, low rank .01, .13, .16, .23, .30, .31, .32, .35, .36, .40 0.29 7th 0.25
low max, high rank .01, .15, .19, .23, .25, .27, .28, .38, .39, .40 0.29 4th 0.25
Experiment 4 high max .01, .04, .12, .14, .21, .23, .31, .44, .54, .60 .27, .33, .39 5th, 4th, 4th 0.41
low max .01, .15, .19, .21, .23, .32, .36, .37, .39, .40 .27, .33, .39 6th, 5th, 2nd* 0.25
Experiment 5 high max, high mean .01, .04, .18, .25, .27, .28, .32, .46, .54, .60 0.32 4th* 0.35
high max, low mean .01, .03, .09, .12, .13, .15, .21, .28, .42, .60 0.32 3rd 0.45
low max, high mean .01, .25, .27, .29, .29, .32, .36, .37, .39, .40 0.32 5th* 0.17
low max, low mean .01, .04, .12, .15, .16, .21, .25, .33, .37, .40 0.32 4th 0.35
Experiment 6 high max .05, .16, .17, .19, .20, .21, .28, .36, .39, .45 0.32 4th 0.26
low max .05, .16, .17, .21, .25, .28, .31, .33, .34, .35 0.32 4th 0.21
Experiment 7 high max math .01, .04, .11, .15, .21, .23, .31, .44, .52, .61 0.29 5th 0.42
low max math .01, .15, .19, .21, .24, .32, .35, .37, .39, .41 0.29 6th 0.25
high max verbal .01, .04, .12, .14, .20, .24, .32, .43, .54, .60 0.29 5th 0.42
Gini calculated using: http://shlegeris.com/gini * denotes tie for that rank
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Table 3.  
Recall of Minimum, Mean, Maximum by Experiment and Condition 
 Experiment 3 (paid .32) Experiment 2 (paid .29) 
 actual 
 
low max high max 
 














































0.42* 0.6        
  Experiment 4 Experiment 5 (paid .32) 
  actual   low max high max   low max high max 
low   0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01 
mean   0.26 0.26   .20/.30 .20/.30 
high   0.40 0.60   0.40 0.60 
 estimated  bonus .27      mean .20     
low   .10* .11*   .05* .06* 
mean  .28* .30*  .24* .26* 
high   .45* .59   .45* .59 
   bonus .33      mean .30     
low   .08* .10*   .09* .04* 
mean  .27* .32*  .30 .30 
high   .44* .59   .44* .60 
   bonus .39           
low   .09* .08*       
mean  .29* .32*       
high   .47* .60              
  Experiment 6 (paid .32) Experiment 7 (paid .29) 
 actual   low max high max   low max high max 
low   0.05 0.05   0.01 0.01 
mean   0.25 0.25   0.26 0.26 
high   0.35 0.45   0.41 0.61/.60 
 estimated   control      math only     
low  .09* .09*   0.10* 0.10* 
mean  .24 .26  0.28 0.32* 
high   .38* .46   0.46* 0.57 
  max salient      saw verbal     
low   .08* .07*   0.09*   
mean  .25 .27  0.28   
high   .40 .48*   0.44*   
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  .21 salient     
verbal 
estimate     
low   .08* .09*     0.11* 
mean  .25 .25    0.30* 
high   .39 .47     0.47*        
* indicates significant difference from actual   
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Appendix 1: Regression Coefficients for All Dependent Variables 
  
Regression Coefficients Secondary DVs Primary DV  
    pay 
compared happy pay 
standardized 
beta 
Study 1a         
constant     5.87   
  High Max   -.42*** -0.18 
      [-.72, -.11]   
          
Study 1b         
constant     2.98   
  High Max   -0.27 -0.08 
      [-.59, .05]   
  Low Min   .44** 0.13 
      [.12, .77]   
          
Study 2         
constant   5.54 5.83   
  High Max -0.38** -0.28* -0.13 
    [-.64, -.11] [-.56, .00]   
  Performance -0.10 -0.12 -0.06 
    [-.36, .17] [-.41, .16]   
          
Study 3         
constant     5.51   
  High Max   -0.23* -0.09 
      [-.47, .00]   
  High Rank   0.12 0.05 
      [-.12, .35]   
          
Study 4         
constant     5.36   
  High Max   -0.44*** -0.18 
      [-.57, -.31]   
  Bonus level 
2   0.44*** 0.17 
      [.28, .59]   
  Bonus level 3   0.78*** 0.29 
      [.62, .95]   
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Regression Coefficients Secondary DVs Primary DV  
    disappointed pay pay compared happy pay standardized beta 
Study 5           
constant   1.73 5.37 5.92   
  High 
Max 0.18 -0.21* -0.29* -0.13 
    [-.07, .43] [-.41, -.02] [-.52, -.07]   
  High 
Mean .41*** -0.61*** -0.34** -0.15 
    [.16, .66] [-.80, -.42] [-.56, -.11]   
            
Study 6           
constant     5.67 6.22   
  High 
Max   -.27*** -.29*** -0.14 
      [-.42, -.12] [-.44, -.13]   
  emph 
high   0.02 -0.11 -0.05 
      [-.16, .20] [-.30, .08]   
  emph 
other   -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 
      [-.26, .11] [-.23, .16]   
            
Study 7           
constant       5.00   
  High 
Max     -0.48* -0.14 
        [-.90, -.06]   
  High 
Other     0.12 0.03 
        [-.30, .54]   
if High Other Accurate       -0.57 -0.11 
(does not change high max)       [-1.25, .11]   
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